We suggest a new framework for the Weyl-Feferman predicativist program by constructing a predicative set theory P ZF which resembles ZF , and is suitable for mechanization. The basic idea is that the predicatively acceptable instances of the comprehension schema are those which determine the collections they define in an absolute way, independent of the extension of the "surrounding universe". The language of P ZF is type-free, and it reflects real mathematical practice in making an extensive use of statically defined abstract set terms. Another important feature of P ZF is that its underlying logic is ancestral logic (i.e. the extension of first-order logic with a transitive closure operation).
Introduction
The predicativist program for the foundations of mathematics, initiated by Poincaré in [32, 33] , seeks to establish certainty in mathematics without revolutionizing it (as the intuitionistic program does). The program, as it is usually conceived nowadays (following Weyl and Feferman) , is based on the following two basic principles:
(PRE) Higher order constructs, such as sets or functions, are acceptable only when introduced through definitions. These definitions cannot be circular. Hence in defining a new construct one can only refer to constructs which were introduced by previous definitions. (NAT) The natural-numbers sequence is a basic well understood mathematical concept, and as a totality it constitutes a set.
The first of these principles, (PRE), was interpreted by Russell according to his philosophical views of logic ( [36] , [37] ), and incorporated as the ramified type theory (RTT) in Principia Mathematica ( [48] ). In RTT objects are divided into types, and each higher-order type is further divided into levels. However, the use of levels makes it impossible to develop mathematics in RTT, and so Russel had to add a special axiom of reducibility which destroyed the predicative nature of his system ( [35] ). The principle was then taken again by Weyl in [46] , but instead of Russel's ramified hierarchy, Weyl adopted the second principle, (NAT), which also goes back to Poincaré. Weyl predicativist program was later extensively pursued by Feferman, who in a series of papers (see e.g. [15] [16] [17] [18] ) developed proof systems for predicative mathematics. Feferman's systems are less complex than RTT, and he has shown that a very large part of classical analysis can be developed within them. He further conjectured that predicative mathematics in fact suffices for developing all the mathematics that is actually indispensable to present-day natural sciences.
Despite this success, Feferman's systems failed to receive in the mathematical community the interest they deserve. Unlike constructive mathematics, they were also almost totally ignored in the computer science community. The main reason for this seems to be the fact that on the one hand Feferman's systems are not "revolutionary" (since they allow the use of classical logic), but on the other hand they are still rather complicated in comparison to the impredicative formal set theory ZF, which provides the standard foundations and framework for developing mathematics. In particular: Feferman's systems still use complicated systems of types, and both functions and classes are taken in them as independent primitives. Therefore working within Feferman's systems is not easy for someone used to ZF (or something similar).
The main goal of this paper is to suggest a new framework for the WeylFeferman predicativist program by constructing an absolutely (at least in our opinion) reliable predicative set theory which is suitable for mechanization, and has the following properties:
(1) Its language is type-free, and it reflects real mathematical practice by making an extensive use of abstract set terms (i.e. terms of the form {x | ϕ}). 1 . (2) Like ZF , it is a pure set theory, in which everything (including functions) is assumed to be a set. Moreover: from a platonic point of view, the universe V of ZF (whatever this universe is) is a model of it. (3) ZF itself (or intuitively true extensions of it) is obtainable from it in a straightforward way.
The Main Ideas

Interpreting and Implementing Principle (PRE)
According to our approach, a predicative set theory need not exclude the possibility that "arbitrary (undefinable) sets of integers", or "real numbers", or even "arbitrary sets of reals", do exist in some sense, and that propositions about them might be meaningful. However, it cannot be committed to the existence of such entities. Accordingly, one may formulate and use in such a theory propositions that refer to all sets. However, only those of them which are true independently of the exact extension of "the true universe V of sets" may be theorems. Therefore classical logic is acceptable, but there should be restrictions on principles that entail the existence "in the universe" of certain objects. Now the major existence principle of naive set theory is given by the comprehension scheme, and so it is this principle that should be restricted. We suggest that principle (PRE) means that the predicatively acceptable instances of the comprehension scheme are those which determine the collections they define in an absolute way, independently of any "surrounding universe". In other words: according to our interpretation of (PRE) in the context of set theory, a formula ψ is predicative (with respect to x) if the collection {x | ψ(x, y 1 , . . . ,y n )} is completely and uniquely determined by the identity of the parameters y 1 , . . . ,y n , and the identity of other objects referred to (e.g. using constants) in the formula (all of which should be well-determined before). 2 Next we translate this idea into an exact definition. For simplicity of presentation, we assume in our definition the "platonic" universe V of ZF .
Notation. We denote by F v(exp) the set of free variables of exp.
Definition 1 Let T be a set theory, and let F v(ϕ) = {y 1 , . . . , y n , x 1 , . . . , x k }. We say that ϕ is predicative in T for {x 1 , . . . , x k } if { x 1 , . . . , x k | ϕ} is a set for all values of the parameters y 1 , . . . , y n , and the following is true (in V ) for every transitive model M of T :
Thus a formula ϕ(x) is predicative (in T ) for x if it has the same extension in all transitive models of T which contains the values of its other parameters. Note on the other hand that a formula is predicative for ∅ iff it is absolute in the usual sense of set theory (see e.g. [30] ).
The main problem in formulating a predicative, type-free, set theory is how to syntactically impose this predicativity property on formulas without introducing syntactic types or levels. The solution suggested here to this problem comes from the observation that this is an instance of a more general task, not peculiar only to set theory. In fact, in [3] and [5] an appropriate purely logical framework that can be used for this task has been introduced. This framework unifies different notions of "safety" of formulas, coming from different areas of mathematics and computer science, like: domain independence in database theory ( [1, 45] ), decidability of arithmetical formulas in computability theory and metamathematics, and absoluteness in set theory. In the next definition we review this framework.
Notation. Let σ be a first-order signature without function symbols, and let S 1 and S 2 be two structures for σ. S 1 ⊆ σ S 2 denotes that the domain of S 1 is a subset of the domain of S 2 , and the interpretations in S 1 and S 2 of the individual constants of σ are identical.
Definition 2
(1) Let S 1 ⊆ σ S 2 , and let F v(ϕ) = {x 1 , . . . ,x n , y 1 , . . . ,y m }, where ϕ is a formula in σ. ϕ is d.i. (domain-independent) for S 1 and S 2 with respect to {x 1 , . . . ,x n } (notation: ϕ S 1 ;S 2 {x 1 , . . . ,x n }), if for all a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ S 2 and b 1 . . . , b m ∈ S 1 :
-signature is a pair (σ, F ), where σ is an ordinary first-order signature with equality and no function symbols, and F is a function which assigns to every n-ary predicate symbol from σ (other than equality) a subset of P({1, . . . , n}). (3) Let (σ, F ) be a d.i.-signature, and let S 1 and S 2 be structures for σ. S 2 is called a (σ, F )−extension of S 1 (and S 1 is a (σ, F )−substructure of S 2 ) if S 1 ⊆ σ S 2 , and p(x 1 , . . . ,x n ) S 1 ;S 2 {x i 1 , . . . , x i k } whenever p is an n-ary predicate of σ, x 1 , . . . ,x n are n distinct variables, and {i 1 , . .
Examples.
• Let σ − → P = {P 1 , . . . , P k }. Assume that the arity of P i is n i , and define
iff it is domain independent in the sense of database theory (see [1, 45] ).
• Let σ N = {0, <, P + , P × }, where 0 is a constant, < is binary, and P + , P × are ternary. Define F N (<) = {{1}}, F N (P + ) = F N (P × ) = {∅}. Then the standard structure N for σ N (with the usual interpretations of 0 and <, and the (graphs of the) operations + and × on N as the interpretations of P + and P × , respectively) is a (σ N , F N )-extension of a structure S for σ N iff the domain of S is an initial segment of N (where the interpretations of the relation symbols are the corresponding reductions of the interpretations of those symbols in N ). It was shown in [5] that every ∆ 0 -formula of σ N is (σ N , F N )-absolute, that every (σ N , F N )-absolute formula defines a decidable relation on the set of natural numbers, and that a relation on the natural numbers is r.e. iff it is definable by a formula of the form ∃y 1 , . . . , y n ψ, where the formula ψ is (σ N , F N )-absolute.
• Let σ ZF = {∈} and let F ZF (∈) = {{1}}. Then S 2 is a (σ ZF , F ZF )−extension of S 1 iff S 1 ⊆ σ ZF S 2 , and x 1 ∈ x 2 S 1 ;S 2 {x 1 }. The latter condition means that S 1 is a transitive substructure of S 2 (In particular, the universe V is a (σ ZF , F ZF )−extension of the transitive sets and classes). Therefore ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y k ) (σ ZF ,F ZF ) {x 1 , . . . , x n } iff the following holds whenever S 1 is a transitive substructure of S 2 , and y 1 , . . . , y k ∈ S 1 :
In particular, a formula is (σ ZF , F ZF )-absolute iff it is absolute in the usual sense this notion is used in set theory.
Obviously, "predicativity" in the sense of "universe independence" and "domain independence" are very close relatives. Accordingly, a plausible interpretation of principle (PRE) is that ϕ is predicative with respect to x iff ϕ (σ ZF ,F ZF ) {x}. However, it follows from results in [5] that the relation (σ ZF ,F ZF ) is undecidable. Therefore in order to base predicative formal systems on this interpretation of principle (PRE) we should replace the semantic relation of (σ, F )−d.i. by a useful syntactic approximation. Now the most natural way to define a syntactic approximation of a semantic logical relation concerning formulas is by a structural induction. Such an inductive definition should be based on the behavior with respect to the original semantic relation of the atomic formulas and of the logical connectives and quantifiers. The next theorem from [5] lists the most obvious and useful relevant properties that every relation (σ,F ) has in the first-order framework:
Theorem 1 (σ,F ) has the following properties:
(1) p(t 1 , . . . , t n ) (σ,F ) X in case p is an n-ary predicate symbol of σ, and there is I ∈ F (p) such that:
By a safety relation we shall henceforth mean a relation between formulas of σ ZF and finite sets of variables which satisfies the clauses in Theorem 1 with respect to F ZF 3 . The least safety relation is a plausible syntactic approximation of predicativity. However, a better approximation is obtained if greater power is given to the first two clauses by providing a much more extensive set of terms than that provided by σ ZF (the only terms of which are its variables). This is achieved by allowing {x | ψ} to be a legal term whenever ψ {x}. Note that this is in full coherence with our intended meaning of . Moreover, this move is still justified by Theorem 1, since its proof remains valid also for languages which include complex terms (not just variables and constants), as long as x = t (σ,F ) {x} whenever x ∈ F v(t).
Interpreting and Implementing Principle (NAT)
First we note that by "acceptance of the set N of natural numbers" we understand here also acceptance of principles and ideas implicit in the construction of N . This includes proofs by mathematical induction, as well as the idea of iterating (an operation or a relation) an arbitrary (finite) number of times. Hence finitary inductive definitions of sets, relations, and functions are accepted. In particular, the ability to form the transitive closure of a given relation (like forming the notion of an ancestor from the notion of a parent) should be taken as a major ingredient of our logical abilities (even prior to our understanding of the natural numbers). In fact, in [2] it was argued that this concept is the key for understanding finitary inductive definitions and reasoning, and evidence was provided for the thesis that systems which are based on it provide the right framework for the formalization and mechanization of mathematics. This suggestion will be used as our main tool for implementing (NAT). Hence in addition to allowing the use of set terms we shall also go beyond FOL (First-Order Logic) by introducing an operation T C for transitive closure 4 . The corresponding language and semantics are defined as follows 3 Clause 7 is easily derivable from the others. Hence if ∀ and → are taken as defined in terms of the other logical constants, then clause 7 can be omitted. 4 It is well known (see [43] ) that the language of FOL enriched with T C is equivalent in its expressive power to the language of weak SOL. So in a way taking "transitive closure" as primitive is equivalent to taking "finite set" as primitive (which is the approach of [21] , though the system presented there is essentially first-order). We prefer the former as primitive, because it allows a natural treatment of induction as a logical rule, as well as a neat extension of the safety relation -see below.
(see, e.g., [27, 26, 43, 13] ):
Definition 3 Let σ be a signature for a first-order language with equality. The language L 1 T C (σ) is defined like the usual first-order language which is based on σ, but with the addition of the following clause: If ϕ is a formula, x, y are distinct variables, and t, s are terms, then (T C x,y ϕ)(t, s) is a formula (in which all occurrences of x and y in ϕ are bound). The intended meaning of (T C x,y ϕ)(t, s) is the following "infinite disjunction": (where w 1 , w 2 , . . . , are all new variables):
The most important relevant facts shown in [2] concerning T C are:
( (c) If ϕ is a formula, x, y are two different variables, and t, s are terms, then (T C x,y ϕ)(t, s) is a formula.
(3) By generalizing a particular case which has been used by Gentzen in [24] , mathematical induction can be presented as a logical rule of languages with T C. Indeed, Using a Gentzen-type format, a general form of this principle can be formulated as follows:
where x and y are not free in Γ, ∆, and y is not free in ψ. Now in order to combine the two central ideas described above, a clause concerning T C should be added to the list of clauses in Theorem 1. Such a clause was suggested in [2] . To understand it, let us look at the first three disjuncts in the infinite disjunction θ which corresponds to (T C x,y ϕ)(x, y):
Call this finite disjunction ψ. From the clauses in Theorem 1 concerning ∧, ∃, and ∨ it follows that if ϕ (σ,F ) X and y ∈ X (or x ∈ X) then ψ (σ,F ) X. This remains true for every finite subdisjunction of the θ. Hence every such finite subdisjunction is d.i. with respect of X, and this easily implies that so is the whole disjunction. This observation leads to the following new condition:
PZF and Its Formal Counterparts
In this section we use the ideas described in the previous section for introducing a family of systems for predicative set theory. All these systems share the same language and the same axioms. They differ only with respect to the strength of their formal underlying logical apparatus. We shall denote by P ZF the strongest (and non-axiomatizable) system in this family.
Language
We define the terms and formula of the language L P ZF , as well as the safety relation P ZF between formulas and finite sets of variables, by simultaneous recursion as follows (where F v(exp) denotes the set of free variables of exp):
Terms:
• Every variable is a term.
• The constant ∅ is a term.
• If x is a variable, and ϕ is a formula such that ϕ P ZF {x}, then {x | ϕ} is a term (and F v({x | ϕ}) = F v(ϕ) − {x}).
Formulas:
• If t and s are terms than t = s and t ∈ s are atomic formulas.
• If ϕ and ψ are formulas, and x is a variable, then ¬ϕ, (ϕ ∧ ψ), (ϕ ∨ ψ), and ∃xϕ are formulas (where F v(∃xϕ) = F v(ϕ) − {x}).
• If ϕ is a formula, t and s are terms, and x and y are distinct variables then (T C x,y ϕ)(t, s) is a formula, and
The Safety Relation P ZF :
The intended intuitive meaning of "ϕ P ZF {y 1 , . . . , y k }", where F v(ϕ) = {y 1 , . . . , y k , x 1 , . . . , x n }, is that for every "accepted" sets a 1 , . . . ,a n , the collection of all tuples y 1 , . . . , y k such that ϕ(y 1 , . . . ,y k , a 1 , . . . , a n ) is a set which is constructed in an absolute, "universe independent" way from previously "accepted" sets and from (elements in the transitive closure of) a 1 , . . . ,a n . Since this is an imprecise explanation, it cannot be proved in the strict sense of the word. However, it is not difficult to convince oneself that P ZF indeed has this property. For example, assume that θ = ϕ ∧ ψ, where F v(ϕ) = {x, z}, F v(ψ) = {x, y, z}, ϕ P ZF {x}, and ψ P ZF {y}. Given some absolute set c, by induction hypothesis the collection Z(c) of all x such that ϕ(x, c) is an absolute set. Again by induction hypothesis, for every d in this set the collection W (c, d) of all y such that ψ(d, y, c) is an absolute set. Now the collection of all x, y such that θ(x, y, c) is the union for d ∈ Z(c) of the sets {d} × W (c, d). Hence it is a set containing only previously accepted, absolute collections, and its identity is obviously absolute too. This is exactly what θ P ZF {x, y} (which holds in this case by the clause concerning conjunction in the definition of P ZF ) intuitively means.
Note 2 Officially, the language we use does not include the universal quantifier ∀ and the implication connective →. Below they are taken therefore as defined (in the usual way) in terms of the official connectives and ∃.
Note 3 It is not difficult to show that P ZF has the following properties:
• If ϕ P ZF X and Z ⊆ X, then ϕ P ZF Z.
• If ϕ P ZF {x 1 , . . . , x n }, v 1 , . . . v n are n distinct variables not occurring in ϕ, and ϕ is obtained from ϕ by replacing all (not only the free) occurrences of
• If x ∈ F v(t), and ϕ P ZF ∅, then both ∀x(x ∈ t → ϕ) P ZF ∅ and ∃x(x ∈ t ∧ ϕ) P ZF ∅. Hence ϕ P ZF ∅ for every ∆ 0 -formula ϕ in L ZF .
The following proposition can easily be proved:
Proposition 1 There is an algorithm which given a string of symbols E determines whether E is a term of L P ZF , a formula of L P ZF , or neither, and in case E is a formula it returns the set of all X such that E P ZF X.
Axioms
We turn to the axioms of P ZF and its formal counterparts. The basic idea here is to use a version of the "ideal calculus" ( [14] ) for naive set theory, in which the comprehension schema is applicable only to safe formulas. In addition we include also ∈-induction, which seems to be quite natural within a predicative framework. Here is the resulting list of axioms:
Extensionality:
The Comprehension Schema:
The Regularity Schema (∈-induction) :
• (∀x(∀y(y ∈ x → ϕ{y/x}) → ϕ)) → ∀xϕ
Logic
The logic which underlies P ZF is T C-logic (transitive closure logic, also called ancestral logic): the logic which corresponds to ordinary first-order logic (with equality) augmented with T C, the operator which produces the transitive closure of a given binary relation. Now the set of valid formulas of this logic is not r.e. (or even arithmetical). Hence no sound and complete formal system for it exists. It follows that P ZF , our version of predicative set theory, cannot be fully formalized. Our hypothesis that the above set of axioms is complete for predicative set theory should therefore be understood as being relative to this underlying logic. This means that according to our approach no single formal system can capture the whole of predicative mathematics. It also follows that the problem of producing formal systems for actually using P ZF (for making formal deductions in predicative mathematics) reduces to finding appropriate formal approximations of this underlying logic. Hence what we introduce here together with P ZF is really a family of formal systems.
One crucial logical rule that should be available in any such approximation is the general rule of induction formulated above. Two other obvious rules for introducing T C on the right hand side of sequents are:
Henceforth we denote by P ZF 0 the formal approximation of P ZF in which the underlying formal logic is the extension of first-order logic with these three rules for T C. P ZF 0 suffices for everything we do below, and we believe (but this remains to be confirmed) that it should in fact suffice for (most of) applicable mathematics. Now P ZF 0 is relatively a weak system. Thus it can easily be interpreted in Kripke-Platek set theory KP together with the infinity axiom (see [7,28,11]) 7 . However, it should again be emphasized that P ZF as a whole is open-ended, and transcends any given formal system. Note 4 In addition to having T C (which is the major difference between our underlying logic and F OL), one should also note that the language of P ZF provides a class of terms which is much richer than those allowed in orthodox first-order systems. In particular: a variable can be bound in it within a term. The notion of a term being free for substitution should be generalized accordingly (also for substitutions within terms!). As usual this amounts to avoiding the capture of free variables within the scope of an operator which binds them. Otherwise the rules/axioms concerning the quantifiers and terms remain unchanged (for example: ∀xϕ → ϕ{t/x} is valid for every term t which is free for x in ϕ). We also assume α-conversion to be a part of the logic 8 .
For simplicity of presentation and understanding, we again assume in the rest of this paper the platonic cumulative universe V (although its exact extension is irrelevant). Predicatively meaningful counterparts of our various claims can be formulated and proved, but we leave this task to another opportunity.
The straightforward proof of the following proposition was practically given in Note 1 (see [4] for a proof of a stronger claim):
Proposition 2 V is a model of P ZF .
4 The Expressive Power of P ZF
Some Standard Notations for Sets
In L P ZF we can introduce as abbreviations most of the standard notations for sets used in mathematics. Note that all these abbreviations can be introduced in a purely static way: unlike in the extension by definition procedure (see [42] ), no formal proofs within the system of corresponding justifying existence and uniqueness propositions are needed before introducing them.
• ∅ = Df {x | x = x}.
• {t 1 , . . . , t n } = Df {x | x = t 1 ∨ . . . ∨ x = t n } (where x is new).
• t, s = Df {{t}, {t, s}}.
• {x ∈ t | ϕ} = Df {x | x ∈ t ∧ ϕ}, provided ϕ P ZF ∅. (where x ∈ F v(t)).
• {t | x ∈ s} = Df {y | ∃x.x ∈ s ∧ y = t} (where y is new, and x ∈ F v(s)).
• s × t = Df {x | ∃a∃b.a ∈ s ∧ b ∈ t ∧ x = a, b } (where x, a and b are new).
• s ∩ t = Df {x | x ∈ s ∧ x ∈ t} (where x is new).
• s ∪ t = Df {x | x ∈ s ∨ x ∈ t} (where x is new).
• S(x) = Df x ∪ {x} • t = Df {x | ∃y.y ∈ t ∧ x ∈ y} (where x and y are new).
• t = Df {x | ∃y(y ∈ t ∧ x ∈ y) ∧ ∀y(y ∈ t → x ∈ y)} (where x, y are new).
• ιxϕ = Df {x | ϕ} (provided ϕ P ZF {x}).
•
y)} (the transitive hull of x).
Our term above for t is valid (and so denotes a set) whenever t is valid. It is easy to see that if t denotes a non-empty set A then t indeed denotes the intersection of all the elements of A. On the other hand, if the set denoted by t is empty, then the set denoted by the term t is empty as well. With the help of the extensionality axiom this in turn implies that if ϕ P ZF {x} then the term above for ιxϕ denotes ∅ if there is no set which satisfies ϕ, and it denotes the intersection of all the sets which satisfy ϕ otherwise. In particular: if there is exactly one set which satisfy ϕ then ιxϕ denotes this unique set. All these facts are theorems of P ZF 0 . In particular we have:
From Proposition 3 it follows that if a formula ϕ(y 1 , . . . ,y n , x) implicitly defines in P ZF a function f ϕ such that for all y 1 , . . . ,y n , f ϕ (y 1 , . . . ,y n ) is the unique x such that ϕ(y 1 , . . . ,y n , x), and if ϕ P ZF {x}, then there is a term in P ZF which explicitly denotes f ϕ , and no extension by definitions of the language is needed for introducing it. Moreover: in P ZF we can introduce as abbreviations the terms used in the λ-calculus for handling explicitly defined functions (except that our terms for functions should specify the domains of these functions, which should be explicitly definable sets):
Identifying ⊥ from domain theory with ∅, we can easily check now that rules β and η obtain in P ZF :
• P ZF 0 u ∈ s → (λx ∈ s.t)u = t{u/x} (if u is free for x in t).
• P ZF 0 u ∈ s → (λx ∈ s.t)u = ∅ (if u is free for x in t).
• P ZF 0 λx ∈ s.t(x) = t/s (in case x ∈ F v(t)).
RST and Rudimentary Functions
Let L RST and RST be defined like L P ZF and P ZF (respectively), but without using the T C operator. Let RST be the first order system in L RST which is based on the three axioms of P ZF (and with a suitable version of ordinary first-order logic as the underlying logic). It should be noted that with the exception of ω and T H(x), all the constructions above have actually been done in the framework of L RST (and can be justified in RST ). Now HF , the set of hereditarily finite sets, is a model of RST . Hence ω is not definable in L RST , and so T C is indeed necessary for its definition 9 .
Note 5 RST can be shown to be equivalent to Gandy's basic set theory ( [22] ) and to the system called BST 0 in [40] .
The following theorem and its two corollaries determine the expressive power of L RST , and connect it (and RST ) with the class of rudimentary set functions -a refined version of Gödel basic set functions (from [25] ) which was independently introduced by Gandy in [22] and Jensen in [29] (See also [10] ).
Theorem 2
(1) If F is an n-ary rudimentary function, then there exists a formula ϕ F with the following properties:
. . ,y k } then there exists a rudimentary function F ϕ such that:
. . ,x n } then there exists a rudimentary function F t such that F t (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) = t for every x 1 , . . . ,x n .
Proof: We prove part (1) by induction, following the definition of the rudimentary functions given in [10] :
by clauses (2) and (3) of the definition of RST .
• If F (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) = x i − x j then ϕ F is y ∈ x i ∧ ¬(y ∈ x j ). Here ϕ F RST {y} by clauses (2), (1a), (1b) and (4) of the definition of RST .
• Suppose F (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) = H (G 1 (x 1 , . . . ,x n ), . . . ,G k (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) ) where H and
Here ϕ F RST {y} by clauses (2), (4), and (5) of the definition of RST .
• Suppose F (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) = z∈x 1 G(z, x 2 , . . . ,x n ), where G is rudimentary.
Then ϕ F is ∃z(z ∈ x 1 ∧ ϕ G (y, z, x 2 , . . . ,x n )). Here again ϕ F RST {y} by clauses (2), (4), and (5) of the definition of RST .
Next we prove part (2) and (3) together by induction on the complexity of ϕ and t.
• If t is x i then F t (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) = x i .
• If t is {y | ϕ}, where ϕ RST {y}, then F t = F ϕ .
• If ϕ is t = s and k = 0 then
The case in which ϕ is t ∈ s and k = 0 is treated similarly.
• If ϕ is ¬ψ and k = 0 then F ϕ (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) = {∅} − F ψ (x 1 , . . . ,x n ).
• If ϕ is y 1 = y 1 (and k = 1) then F ϕ (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) = ∅.
• If ϕ is y 1 = t or t = y 1 , where y 1 ∈ F v(t) (and k = 1), then F ϕ (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) = {F t (x 1 , . . . ,x n )}.
• If ϕ is y 1 ∈ t, where y 1 ∈ F v(t) (and k = 1), then
It is not difficult to see that all functions defined above are indeed rudimentary.
Corollary 1 Every term of L RST with n free variables explicitly defines an nary rudimentary function. Conversely, every rudimentary function is defined by some term of L RST .
Corollary 2 If F v(ϕ) = {x 1 , . . . ,x n }, and ϕ RST ∅, then ϕ defines a rudimentary predicate P . Conversely, if P is a rudimentary predicate, then there is a formula ϕ such that ϕ RST ∅, and ϕ defines P .
The next theorem and its corollaries shed further light on the strength of L RST and RST (By a "∆ 0 -formula" we mean in them a ∆ 0 -formula in the pure language of ZF ).
Theorem 3
(1) If ψ is a ∆ 0 formula, x is a variable, and t is a term of RST which is free for x in ψ, then ψ{t/x} is equivalent in RST to a ∆ 0 -formula. (2) If ϕ RST {x 1 , . . . ,x n } and ψ is a ∆ 0 -formula, then ∃x 1 . . . x n (ϕ ∧ ψ) is equivalent in RST to a ∆ 0 -formula.
Proof: By a simultaneous induction on the complexity of t and ϕ.
• If t is a variable then the claim is obvious.
• Suppose t is {y | ϕ}, where ϕ RST {y}. We prove the claim for t by an internal induction on the complexity of ψ. · If x is not free in ψ (in particular: if ψ is of the form ∃x ∈ z.ψ 1 ) then the claim is obvious. · If ψ is x ∈ x then ψ{t/x} is equivalent in RST to to ∃x ∈ x.x ∈ x. · If ψ is x = x then ψ{t/x} is equivalent in RST to to ¬∃x ∈ x.x ∈ x. · Suppose ψ is z ∈ x, where z is a variable different from x. We may assume that z is not bound in ϕ. Then ψ{t/x} is equivalent in RST to ϕ{z/y}. Since ϕ RST ∅, ϕ is equivalent in RST to a ∆ 0 -formula by the induction hypothesis for ϕ. Hence so does ϕ{z/y}. · Suppose ψ is z = x or x = z, where z is a variable different from x.
We may assume that z is not y. Then ψ{t/x} is equivalent in RST to (∀y ∈ z.ϕ) ∧ ¬∃y(ϕ ∧ y ∈ z). Since ϕ RST {y} and ϕ RST ∅, ϕ and ∃y(ϕ ∧ y ∈ z) are equivalent in RST to ∆ 0 -formulas by the external induction hypothesis for ϕ. It follows that so is ψ{t/x}. · Suppose ψ is x ∈ z, where z is a variable different from x. Let w be a fresh variable. Then ψ{t/x} is logically equivalent to ∃w ∈ z.w = t. By the previous case, w = t is equivalent in RST to a ∆ 0 formula. Hence so is ψ{t/x}. · If ψ is ¬ψ 1 or ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 , then the claim for ψ follows from the induction hypothesis for ψ 1 and ψ 2 . · Suppose ψ is of the form ∃z ∈ x.ψ 1 (where z is different from x). Since t is free for x in ψ, z does not occur free in ϕ, and we may assume that it does not occur in ϕ at all. Then ψ{t/x} is equivalent in RST to ∃z(ϕ{z/y} ∧ ψ 1 {t/x}). Since z does not occur in ϕ and ϕ RST {y}, also ϕ{z/y} RST {z}. Hence by the external I.H. (Induction Hypothessis) for ϕ, and the internal I.H. for ψ 1 , ψ{t/x} is equivalent in RST to a ∆ 0 -formula. · If ψ is of the form ∃z ∈ w.ψ 1 , where both w and z are different from x, then the claim for ψ is immediate from the internal I.H. for ψ 1 .
• Suppose ϕ is atomic (and so ϕ RST ∅). Then ϕ is either t 1 ∈ t 2 or t 1 = t 2 for some terms t 1 and t 2 . Since x ∈ y and x = y are ∆ 0 -formulas, it follows by applying the induction hypotheses for t 1 and t 2 that ϕ is equivalent to a ∆ 0 -formula. Hence ϕ ∧ ψ is equivalent to a ∆ 0 -formula whenever ψ is.
• Suppose that ϕ is of the form x = x, where x is a variable. Then ∃x(ϕ ∧ ψ)
is equivalent in RST to ∃x ∈ x.ψ, and this in turn is equivalent to a ∆ 0 -formula whenever ψ is.
• Suppose that ϕ is of the form x ∈ t, where x ∈ F v(t). Since ϕ RST {x} in this case, we have to prove that for every ∆ 0 -formula ψ, ∃x(x ∈ t ∧ ψ) is equivalent to a ∆ 0 -formula. This follows from the induction hypothesis for t, since the last formula is θ{t/z}, where z is a fresh variable, and θ is the ∆ 0 -formula ∃x(x ∈ z ∧ ψ) (note that since x ∈ F v(t), t is free for z in θ).
• Suppose that ϕ is of the form x = t or t = x, where x is not free in t. Since ϕ RST {x} in this case, we have to prove that for every ∆ 0 -formula ψ, ∃x(x = t ∧ ψ) is equivalent to a ∆ 0 -formula. By changing bound variables, we may assume that t is free for x in ψ. This and the fact that x ∈ F v(t) together imply that ∃x(x = t ∧ ψ) is logically equivalent to ψ{t/x}. This formula, in turn, is equivalent in RST to a ∆ 0 -formula by our I.H. for t.
• Suppose ϕ is ¬ϕ 1 , where ϕ 1 RST ∅ (and so also ¬ϕ 1 RST ∅). By I.H. for ϕ, ϕ is equivalent in RST to a ∆ 0 -formula. Hence so is also ¬ϕ ∧ ψ for every ∆ 0 -formula ψ.
• Suppose ϕ is ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 , where ϕ 1 RST {x 1 , . . . ,x n } and ϕ 2 RST {x 1 , . . . ,x n } (and so ϕ RST {x 1 , . . . ,x n }). Then ∃x 1 . . . x k (ϕ ∧ ψ) is logically equivalent to ∃x 1 . . . x k (ϕ 1 ∧ψ)∨∃x 1 . . . x k (ϕ 2 ∧ψ). Hence the I.H. for ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 entails that ∃x 1 . . . x k (ϕ ∧ ψ) is equivalent in RST to a ∆ 0 -formula whenever ψ is.
• Suppose ϕ is ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 , where ϕ 1 RST {x 1 , . . . ,x n }, ϕ 2 RST {y 1 , . . . ,y k }, and {y 1 , . . . ,
. By applying the I.H. first to ϕ 2 , and then to ϕ 1 , we get that ∃x 1 . . . y k (ϕ∧ψ) is equivalent in RST to a ∆ 0 -formula whenever ψ is.
• Suppose ϕ is ∃yϕ 1 where ϕ 1 RST {x 1 , . . . ,x n , y} (and ϕ RST {x 1 , . . . ,x n }).
Let ψ be a ∆ 0 -formula. Then ∃x 1 . . . x n (ϕ ∧ ψ) is logically equivalent to the formula ∃x 1 . . . x n z(ϕ 1 {z/y} ∧ ψ), where z is a fresh variable. Since ϕ 1 {z/y} RST {x 1 , . . . ,x n , z}, the I.H. for ϕ 1 {z/y} implies that the formula ∃x 1 . . . x n (ϕ ∧ ψ) is equivalent in RST to a ∆ 0 -formula.
Note 6 On the other hand, it can happen that ϕ RST X, but θ RST X, where θ is the ∆ 0 -formula to which ϕ is equivalent according to the construction given in the last proof. Let for example ϕ be the formula x = {y} (i.e. x = {z | z = y}). In this case θ is the formula y ∈ x ∧ ∀z ∈ x.z = y. Now θ RST {x}, even though ϕ RST {x}.
A remedy to this problem might be obtained by adding to the definition of RST the clause:
The addition of this clause suffices indeed for getting a system in the language of ZF which is equivalent to RST . However, ∀y(y ∈ x ↔ ϕ) is not necessarily a ∆ 0 -formula in case ϕ is. From the above theorem it follows that it is equivalent in RST to a ∆ 0 -formula θ, but then again there seems to be no guarantee that θ RST {x}.
Note 7
In the terminology of [22] , every term t of RST is substitutable (in ∆ 0 -formulas). Our proof of theorem 3 is indeed closely related to Gandy's proof in [22] that every rudimentary (or "basic") function is substitutable.
Recursion and Inductive Definitions
The inclusion of the operation T C in L P ZF strongly extends its expressive power. As a simple example of this power we take primitive recursion on ω:
Proposition 4 Assume g is a function on ω 2 which is definable by a (closed) term of L P ZF . Let f be a function on ω defined by f (0) = a, f (n + 1) = g(n, f (n)) (where a is definable in L P ZF ). Then f is definable (as a set of pairs) by a closed term of L P ZF .
Proof: Assume t g is a term which defines g in L P ZF . Let ψ 1 (z, w) be the formula (T C z,w w = S(P 1 (z)), t g (z) )(z, w) (note that we use here the notation for function application which was introduced in subsection 4.1). Let ψ 2 be the formula z = 0, a ∧ ψ 1 (z, w) ∧ P 1 (w) = n ∧ P 2 (w) = x, and ϕ the formula ∃z∃wψ 2 . Since w = S(P 1 (z)), t g (z)
P ZF {w}, also ψ 1 P ZF {w} (by the clause concerning T C in the definition of P ZF ). Hence ψ 2 P ZF {z, w, n, x} (by the clauses concerning ∧ and = in the definition of P ZF ). It follows that ϕ P ZF {n, x}, and so ιxϕ is defined. Since it is easy to prove by induction that P ZF 0 ∀n ∈ ω∃!xϕ, Proposition 3 entails that λn ∈ ω.ιxϕ is a term as required.
Proposition 4 is only a special case of the following much more general theorem, which implies that all types of finitary inductive definitions (as characterized in [19] ) are available in L P ZF :
Theorem 4 For 1 ≤ j ≤ p, let ϕ 1 (y, x 1 , . . . ,x n 1 ), . . . ,ϕ p (y, x 1 , . . . ,x np ) be p formulas such that ϕ j P ZF {y}, and let k 1 (j), . . . , k n j (j) and o(j) be (not necessarily distinct) natural numbers between 1 and m. Assume that A 1 , . . . ,A m are sets and that B 1 , . . . ,B m are the least X 1 , . . . ,X m which satisfy the following conditions (for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ p):
. . ,a n j ∈ X kn j (j) , and ϕ j (b, a 1 , . . . ,a n j ) then b ∈ X o(j) Then B 1 , . . . ,B m are definable by terms of L P ZF with parameters A 1 , . . . ,A m .
The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 15 in [2] .
Example: The set HF of hereditarily finite sets is the least set X such that {∅} ⊆ X, and y ∈ X whenever a ∈ X, b ∈ X, and y = a ∪ {b}. Hence HF is defined by a closed term of L P ZF .
Relations with the Axioms of ZF
The definability of {t, s}, t, and ω means that the axioms of pairing, union, and infinity are provable in P ZF . On the other hand {x ∈ t | ϕ} is a valid term only if ϕ P ZF ∅. Hence we do not have in P ZF the full power of the other comprehension axioms of ZF . Instead we have the following counterparts:
The predicative separation schema: If ϕ P ZF ∅; ψ is equivalent in P ZF 0 to ϕ; x, w, Z are distinct variables and Z ∈ F v(ψ), then:
The predicative replacement schema: If x ∈ F v(t) then
The predicative collection schema: If ϕ P ZF {x}; ψ is equivalent in P ZF 0 to ϕ; x, y, w, Z are distinct variables, and Z ∈ F v(ψ), then:
The predicative powerset schema: If ϕ P ZF {x}; ψ is equivalent in P ZF 0 to ϕ; x, w, Z are distinct variables, and Z ∈ F v(ψ), then:
Thus although P (ω), the powerset of ω, is not available in P ZF (This easily follows from Theorem 5 below, and the fact that P (ω) is not absolute), every subset {x | ϕ} of P (ω) definable by a formula ϕ such that ϕ P ZF {x} is available nevertheless.
At this point it is interesting to note that T ZF , a system similar to P ZF 0 which is intuitively sound (from a platonistic point of view), and does have the full power of ZF (though not ZF C), can be defined in a way similar to P ZF 0 , but using another relation, T ZF , instead of P ZF . T ZF is the relation obtained by adding to the definition of L P ZF the following three conditions:
(1) ϕ T ZF ∅ for every formula ϕ.
(2) ϕ T ZF {x} if ϕ ∈ {x ⊆ t}, and x ∈ F v(t).
In [4] it was shown a first-order system with is equivalent to ZF (but more natural and easier to mechanize than the usual presentation of ZF ) is obtained from T ZF if the underlying logic is changed to classical first-order logic (in a first-order language enriched with abstract terms), and instead of using T C, a special constant for ω is added to the language, together with Peano's axioms for it. This shows that ZF and P ZF are indeed close in spirit.
The Predicativity of P ZF
The following theorem implies that P ZF indeed satisfies condition (PRE):
Theorem 5
(1) If ϕ P ZF X then ϕ is predicative in P ZF for X.
(2) If t is a valid term of P ZF then t is predicative in the sense that it satisfies the following condition: If F v(t) = {y 1 , . . . , y n } then the following is true (in V ) for every transitive model M of P ZF :
where t M denotes the relativization of t to M.
Discussion. By Theorem 5, every term t of L P ZF has the same interpretation in all transitive models of P ZF which contains the values of its parameters. Thus the identity of the set denoted by t is independent of the exact extension of the assumed universe of sets. This already justifies seeing P ZF as predicative. However, we want to argue that the predicativity of P ZF intuitively goes deeper than this. The argument will necessary be less exact (and on a more intuitive level) than that given by Theorem 5.
The problem with Theorem 5 is that it is a theorem of platonistic mathematics, and so it assumes an all-encompassing collection V which includes all potential "sets", contains all "universes", but is itself a universe too (meaning that classical logic holds within it). This assumption is doubtful from a predicativist point of view 10 . To see how we can do without it, call two universes M 1 and M 2 compatible if the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) Suppose a is an object in both
2) Suppose a and b are objects in M 1 and M 2 (respectively), and the collections {x ∈ M 1 | M 1 |= x ∈ a} and {x ∈ M 2 | M 2 |= x ∈ b} are identical. Then a and b are identical (Here we temporarily use the notation {x | A} in the metalanguage to denote classes of objects.
It is now not difficult to check that if t is a term of L P ZF then the value of t for the assignment x 1 := a 1 , . . . ,x n := a n (where F V (t) = {x 1 , . . . ,x n }) is the same in any two compatible universes which includes {a 1 , . . . ,a n }. This is what we really had in mind when we talked above about "universe independence" (note that if the platonic V is a universe, then every two transitive subcollections of V are compatible according to the definition above).
Turning next to principle (NAT), we first of all note again that the set of natural numbers is available in P ZF in the form of ω. This easily implies that P A, the first-order Peano's Arithmetics, has a natural interpretation in P ZF 0 (see Proposition 4 for a partial proof). However, the availability of ω alone is not sufficient for getting the full power of mathematical induction, since the full separation schema is not available in P ZF . However, the fact that the underlying logic is the T C-logic implies that the following induction schema is available (alternatively, this schema can be derived from the availability of ω with the help of ∈-induction):
No less crucial than the ability to use induction is the ability to use inductive definitions. Theorem 4 (see also Proposition 4) entails that the most important form of using such definitions is available in L P ZF . To what extent the ability to use inductive definitions goes beyond that might depend on the strength of the chosen system for T C-logic. We leave that for further research.
Note 8 Unlike in the case of proofs by induction (where ∈-induction would do), the T C-machinery is essential for the ability to use in P ZF inductive definitions. Now in previous systems for predicative mathematics, recursion in ω was obtained using ∆-comprehension. The explanation was that a ∆-formula ϕ is both upward absolute and downward absolute, and so it is absolute. This argument implicitly assume the platonic universe V , and so it is doubtful in view of the discussion of (P RE) in this section (without V as a maximal universe, or some other doubtful assumption concerning universes, I do not see why the combination of upward absoluteness and of downward absoluteness entails absoluteness).
Conclusion and Further Research
We have suggested a new framework for developing predicative mathematics, which is very close in its spirit to ZF . The main things to be done next are:
• To produce concrete formal systems within the framework of P ZF (based on valid, sufficiently strong formal systems for TC-logics), to determine their proof-theoretical strength, and to develop large portions of classical mathematics in them.
• To determine the relations of our framework and systems with other previous works concerned with predicative set theory. This includes first of all Feferman's various systems for predicative mathematics, and the works of Schütte's school [41, 34] . Also relevant are the proof-theoretic investigations of systems of Kripke-Platek set theory by Jäger, Pohlers, and Rathjen (a partial list), as well as the works on Constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory by Aczel, Beeson, Friedman, Gambino, Rathjen, and many others.
• The set HD 0 of all sets which are definable by closed term of L P ZF is the minimal transitive model of P ZF (the proof of this very intuitive theorem is not trivial, and will be given in a future paper). We take this structure to be the most absolute part of the mathematical universe. Accordingly, a more constructive characterization of this structure, as well as its potential applications, should be made.
• Further extensions of the framework will be considered. One possible direction is adding counterparts of "axioms of strong infinity", like an axiom stating that HD 0 is a set (this process can be repeated, of course).
The significance of such a project for the foundations (and Philosophy) of Mathematics is evident 11 . However, the framework we have suggested here has important applications to computer science too:
• There are by now several theorem provers designed for the formalization of large portions of classical or constructive mathematics, like: Automath ( [6] ), Isabelle/HOL ( [31] ), and Mizar ( [44] ) (to name just a few). As we have noted above, despite its importance there is none which is devoted to (or has seriously been used for formalization of) predicative mathematics. We hope that our framework might change this unfortunate state of affairs by providing systems suitable for mechanization. Moreover: as standard set theory can be presented as a straightforward extension of our system(s), their mechanization might facilitate the difficult task of mechanizing standard set theory (and so of mathematics in general).
• As is emphasized and demonstrated in [8, 9] , Set theory has not only a great pragmatic advantage as a basic language for mathematical discourse, but it also has a great technical advantages as a basis for specification languages, declarative programming, and proof verifiers designed to prove correctness of anything more than toy programs. Now predicative set theory, as we envisage it here, is much simpler and easier to mechanize than full set theory, and yet it would suffice for all the needs described in [8, 9] . Moreover: the connection between our framework and database theory suggests that current techniques used for databases might be useful for this task.
